The recent book, Command and Control, addresses an interesting and still
vitally important topic. Namely, it examines nuclear weapons control and safety.
We all too often fail to remember that the prime job of the Secretary of Energy
is no electric cars but management and oversight of the nuclear weapons
development and distribution. This book presents a diorama of many of the
events surrounding the deployment and control of such weapons.
However, as many other reviewers had noted, the style of the
book can be very frustrating at times. The author uses the Damascus incident as
an ongoing connector to other historical tale recounting the development of
nuclear weapons control and the mistakes that have occurred over the decades.
After a while this approach becomes not only distracting but an annoyance. For
example the author will take the Damascus Incident, an incident when the maintenance
of a liquid fuel Titan II was damaged by a Tech apparently not following
protocol, and then ultimately exploding, as a metaphor for each of the Chapters
which are interspersed. Thus one is supposed to be drawn to see mistakes in the
small and mistakes in the large. Nice idea but it just does not seem to work.
Now, I will discuss the text in toto. If one can work around
the style, the book tells a compelling tale. It begins at the beginning, Los
Alamos, and then proceeds to detail the many developments in the evolution of
nuclear weapons. There are excellent discussions of the political in-fighting
and the pros and cons of military control over the weapons. LeMay plays a key
role during this early period as well he should. LeMay was a pivotal player
whose world view of war was massive total destruction. LeMay viewed war as a
total destruction of the enemy, as he had done in Europe and in the Pacific.
Lemay in a sense was the driving force for military use and deployment.
The author does an excellent job in developing the issue of
who control nuclear weapons, by going over the various ways in which the
weapons flowed into military hands. The design and building of the weapons was
done under AEC and then DoE aegis with the support of such places as Sandia
Labs in Albuquerque. Sandia was managed by AT&T under a Government contract
and was a massive facility adjacent to Kirkland AFB which itself was adjacent
to the airport at Albuquerque. Sandia developed various weapons and weapon security
systems. Tests of the weapons were often done by DoE or its predecessor the
AEC. The author integrates these efforts into the text. It would have been
interesting to have developed the significant interplay between DoE and DOD as
weapons systems evolved.
The author interweaves many other near miss events into the
text in a chronological basis between the evolving tale of the Damascus event.
Such near misses as the explosion of a B-52 over North Carolina and the loss of
2 H bombs over Span and but a few.
The author does a reasonable job in describing the safety
procedures employed but it would possibly have been more enlightening to have
some first-hand descriptions. Many “fail-safe” procedures had been developed
but as the author states each time an improvement to a fail-safe was done it
potentially impeded the effectiveness of the weapon.
There are several areas, in my opinion, which the author has
missed or touched lightly upon and should have been included or expanded upon:
1. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: On almost a one to one basis the
Soviets matched the US for weapons of vast killing power. The Soviets often
played games of chicken with US SAC forces and this would frequently be at the
risk of deployment of weapons, especially tactical weapons. In addition the use
of the nuclear submarine fleet and the games played there also presented dramatic
threats. It would have been useful to have had this interplay discussed
somewhat. The classic Triad of aircraft, submarines and missiles would also
have been useful to draw together. Understanding Soviet capability and control
would have made an excellent counterpoint.
2. Tactical Weapons and Special Weapons Depots: Tactical
weapons were always considered just a step above a large non-nuclear weapon,
and early on not w real nuclear weapon. The author does discuss the Davy
Crockett weapons but in reality there were hundreds of Special Weapons Depots,
SWD, across the globe which contained these types of weapons. The SWDs were
reasonably well guarded but their very number often gave one concern not just
because of what they contained but often because one could not reasonably
expect to get the best personnel at this many locations. They also were DOD
controlled and thus were subject to the change of staff which raised the risk
of failure to follow protocols. Thus the proliferation of Tactical weapons, 1KT
ranges, were in reality a serious byproduct of the enthusiasm early on for
nuclear solutions.
3. Other National Weapons Controls: The British, French,
Chinese, Israelis, Pakistanis, Indians, and South Africans as well as North
Korea and Iran all have dabbled in nuclear weapons and many have collections in
their arsenals.
4. Nuclear Weapons Treaties: There were many discussions
between the US, UK and Soviets from time to time. They typically dealt with
testing and proliferation. I spent the latest 70s as an advisor to ACDA and the
CTBT during the Carter Administration and dealt with the Soviets firsthand. Neither
side trusted the other, yet side conversations between the parties were about
children and grandchildren. Thus, although both sides were prepared for
ultimate destruction, both sides also had a view of the humanity of the others.
The author discusses Professor Pipe’s works at that time, and I knew Pipes
well, and as a refugee from Poland Pipes knew firsthand the Soviets. Thus
somehow there had to be a convergence of interests. MAD and Reagan’s efforts,
in my opinion, on pushing what “could happen” did eventually get the sides to
stand down, somewhat. The author discusses this issue but it could have been
more fully developed.
5. Strategists: The influence of Herman Kahn and thinks like
him also has an overpowering role to play. Kahn is recognized as the promoter
of the MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction strategy. Namely if both sides are
rational and both sides have so much excess nuclear capabilities then no side
would rationally start a first strike. Kahn started out at Rand and ended at
the Manhattan Institute but it would have been useful to integrate these
efforts a bit more including the many such efforts at Rand.
6. Technological Elements: The WWMCCS discussion was lightly
approached and in a sense it could have been a section unto itself. The whole
concept of command, control, communications and intelligence came out in this
period. However these were massively complex systems with detailed methods and
procedures and whose very structure could very well have overburdened any
rational response capability. The author’s example of the Burroughs computers
is but one simple example of grand technological ideas and ideals supported by
antiquated technical implementations.
Overall the book contains some relevant materials that explain
a world in the past. The current environment, however, with proliferation of
such weapons, dramatically changes the landscape. For example, would the US try
a MAD strategy on a rouge state nuclear capable nation the effect may be de
minimis. Thus how would one address such factors? Here the past may only be
partly prologue to the future. Thus the book is well worth the read even if at
times it can be a bit off-putting in style.
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